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A Defence of Cosmopolitan Global Justice

Abstract:
Constructing a theory of global socioeconomic justice presents both conceptual and
normative challenges. Should one strive for the uncompromising moral and humanitarian ideal of
equality, or do the difficulties of international governance demand a more pragmatic understanding
of justice? In “The Problem of Global Justice”, Thomas Nagel defends what he calls the political
conception of global justice. Nagel’s account holds that socioeconomic justice only exists within
states, not between them. From this it follows that developed states do nothing unjust when they
decline to transfer wealth to developing states. While Nagel’s account has some initial appeal, I
find cosmopolitanism to be a far more compelling account of global socioeconomic justice. My
defence has three parts. First, I argue that Nagel misunderstands the relationship between justice
and sovereignty under cosmopolitanism. I then demonstrate that, properly understood,
cosmopolitanism can justify limiting the scope of socioeconomic justice to state borders through
the right of self-determination. I conclude by highlighting that cosmopolitanism can not only limit
socioeconomic justice in the same way Nagel’s political conception can, but that it can do so with
a clearer rationale and greater applicability to reality.
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Introduction:
One of the most pressing current problems facing humanity concerns what duties, if any,
states and citizens in the Global North owe to states and citizens in the Global South. Is there an
obligation to transfer or distribute resources from the wealthy to the less well off? If so, what theory
might explain or account for such a duty? In “The Problem of Global Justice” Thomas Nagel
considers how one might understand socioeconomic justice on a global scale. Beginning with
fundamental questions regarding the relationship between justice and sovereignty, Nagel presents
two possible accounts of global socioeconomic justice, which he calls cosmopolitanism and the
political conception. After briefly explaining both, Nagel defends a version of the political
conception, one that centres relations of justice on citizenship and on the role of citizens in the
state. Of particular importance to Nagel’s account are the limits that citizenship imposes on claims
of socioeconomic justice. However, despite the reasons Nagel gives for his version of the political
conception, I find cosmopolitanism to be a far more compelling theory of global justice, and in this
paper I will try to explain why. In Part I of the paper, I will provide a brief account of Nagel’s
work, and summarize some crucial claims he makes regarding justice and provide a full description
of his version of the political conception. In Part II, I will provide my critique of Nagel’s work,
pointing out the problems his theory encounters and providing an explanation as to why I find
cosmopolitanism more persuasive. More specifically, the second half of my paper will establish
that cosmopolitanism can not only limit socioeconomic justice in the same way Nagel’s political
conception can, but also does so with a clearer rationale and greater applicability to reality.
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Part I — A Summary of Nagel
A) Justice & Sovereignty
Nagel begins by focusing his attention on two concepts he believes are crucial for
understanding justice on a global scale: “the relation between justice and sovereignty, and the scope
and limits of equality as a demand of justice”.1 Beginning with the relationship between justice and
sovereignty, Nagel claims that “[separate] individuals, however attached to [justice], have no
motive … to conform to [institutions of justice] on their own, without the assurance that their
conduct will in fact be part of a reliable and effective system”.2 Nagel claims that such assurance
can only arise “through some form of law, with centralized authority to determine the rules and a
centralized monopoly of the power of enforcement”3; in other words, only through the institutions
of a sovereign political state. Consequently, Nagel believes that “[it] is only the operation of [a
sovereign state’s institutions] that one can judge to be just or unjust”. 4 In short: Nagel’s claim here
is that only the institutions of a sovereign state can be considered just or unjust. This means that
there can be no question of justice outside the territorial or political borders of a state; equivalently,
that sovereignty is required to create institutions of justice.

B) Cosmopolitanism & The Political Conception
Having articulated his view about the relation between justice and sovereignty, Nagel then
turns to his second point of focus, namely “the scope and limits of equality as a demand of justice”.5
The question he seeks to answer is “how to respond to world inequality in general from the point
1
2
3
4
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of view of justice and injustice rather than humanity alone”. 6 Nagel recognizes, however, that the
answer to this question will depend heavily on how one conceptualizes the relationship between
justice and the institutions made possible by sovereign authority.7 To address this, Nagel outlines
two conceptions of justice: cosmopolitanism and the political conception.
Cosmopolitanism conceives of justice and its associated obligations as entirely independent
from the institutions created to implement it. Under this conception, “the demands of justice derive
from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human
beings…”. 8 Additionally, “…the moral basis for the requirements of justice … is universal in
scope…”. 9 Cosmopolitan justice is derived from a universal moral duty, making its existence
independent from the institutions created to espouse it. Institutions of justice are merely instruments
by which we can fulfill our duties owed through justice.10 With a universal scope, cosmopolitan
global justice would require a worldwide system of institutions to realize universal standards of
fairness. Since such a system would, in his view, necessarily require global sovereignty, Nagel
concludes that the existence of multiple sovereign states is a problematic obstacle to global justice
under the cosmopolitan view.11
The political conception, on the other hand, understands justice as dependent on the
institutions created to implement it. According to the political conception, it is through the exercise
of sovereign power that states impose upon their citizens “a duty of justice toward one another
through the legal, social, and economic institutions that sovereign power makes possible”. 12
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Consequently, it is because of this connection between justice and sovereignty that “[the] full
standards of justice … apply only within the boundaries of a sovereign state…”.13 In other words,
justice only exists within states, and is an associative obligation owed between citizens. Nagel also
clarifies that, though obligations of justice arise from the special relationship shared by those under
a sovereign power, one is not obligated to extend this relation to others.14 In fact, Nagel asserts that
one would be free to actively avoid extending these relations to avoid incurring further obligations
of justice.15 Unlike cosmopolitanism, the political conception finds no issue with the lack of justice
on a global scale as justice only exists within states, not between them. Like cosmopolitanism, the
political conception would view a worldwide system of institutions under a global sovereign as
global justice, since making the world one sovereign state mean everyone is a citizen and ensure
relations of justice for all.

C) Nagel’s Political Conception
Having established the general basis of the political conception, Nagel elucidates the
version of it he finds most plausible. In doing so, he addresses three major questions faced by the
political conception: (1) how can one justify restricting the scope of justice to the borders of the
state; (2) why state citizenship, an arbitrary trait, should dictate the scope of justice; and (3) whether
there is an obligation to extend relations of citizenship to those currently excluded from those
relations.
Recall that, according to the political conception, justice is a duty imposed on citizens
through the exercise of sovereign power of a state. Beginning with the question of why justice only
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applies within the state, Nagel provides the following answer: “[Justice] depends on positive rights
that we do not have against all other persons or groups, rights that arise only because we are joined
together … in a political society under strong centralized control”.16 This explains the limited scope
of the right to justice, as “[it] is only from such a system, and from our fellow members through its
institutions, that we can claim a right to … the amelioration … of unfairness in the distribution of
social and economic goods”.17 As it is based on positive rights held against fellow citizens, justice
is thus contained exclusively within the state.
While this explanation does provide a method of limiting the scope of justice, it contains a
paradox, which Nagel readily acknowledges: “What is interesting and somewhat surprising about
[citizenship] is that such co-membership is itself arbitrary, so an arbitrary distinction is responsible
for the scope of the presumption against arbitrariness”.18 Citizenship is an arbitrary trait, yet the
political conception views citizenship as the determinant for who is entitled to protection against
arbitrary inequalities; who has rights to justice. This begs the question of why citizenship, an
arbitrary trait, determines the scope for the prohibition against arbitrary inequalities. Recognizing
this problem, Nagel identifies what he takes to be the unique element of citizenship that
distinguishes it from other arbitrary traits, namely the fact that “we are both putative joint authors
of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, … creates the special presumption
against arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the system”.19 Exactly how citizens are authors of
their state institutions will be discussed later in my critique. For now, it is suffice to say that this
authorship, in tandem with being subject to state institutions, is what allows citizens, and only
citizens, to make demands of equality against the state, “and those exceptional demands bring with
16

Nagel, supra note 1 at 127.
Ibid at 127 [emphasis added].
18
Ibid at 128.
19
Ibid at 128-129.
17

6

them … the positive obligations of justice”.20 It is these twin roles of author and subject that make
citizenship a suitable limit on the scope of justice.
The last issue Nagel addresses with respect to the political conception is whether there
exists any obligation to extend the relations of citizenship to those outsides one’s borders. To begin,
Nagel recognizes that, while relations of justice are contingent on citizenship, “there are also
noncontingent, universal relations in which we stand to everyone…”.21 These universal relations
are what Nagel refers to as “minimal humanitarian morality” which “governs our relation to all
other persons”.22 Nagel believes this universal relation only requires us “to pursue our ends within
boundaries that leave [non-citizens] free to pursue theirs, and to relieve them from extreme threats
and obstacles to such freedom…”.23 More specifically, while humanitarian morality does create a
‘right to justice’, which is “the right that the society one lives in be justly governed” 24, this right
does not obligate others to extend relations of citizenship. As Nagel eloquently puts it: “[everyone]
may have the right to live in a just society, but we do not have an obligation to live in a just society
with everyone”. 25 Thus, this minimal humanitarian morality creates no obligation to extend
relations of citizenship to those outside the state.

D) Executive Summary
Before moving on to critiques, it is helpful to summarize Nagel’s account thus far. Rejecting
the universal moral principles of cosmopolitanism, Nagel’s account of the political conception of
global justice cites the relations of citizenship as the basis for justice. Defending this choice, Nagel
20
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asserts that the dual roles associated with citizenship, being both author of, and subject to, the
institutions of the state, make it appropriate as a basis for justice. Lastly, while the political
conception recognizes a minimal humanitarian morality, Nagel asserts that this morality does not
obligate one to enter into relations of citizenship with those outside their state. As such, justice
exists exclusively within the borders of the state and only between citizens.

8

Part II — A Critique of Nagel & Defence of Cosmopolitanism
Having described Nagel’s version of the political conception, the rest of my paper will be
dedicated to my critique of his position and my defence of cosmopolitanism. My goal is to
demonstrate that cosmopolitanism is a superior theory to Nagel’s political conception. This will be
done in three stages. First, I will criticize Nagel’s claim that only sovereign institutions can be
viewed as just or unjust, arguing instead that, under cosmopolitanism, the standards of justice apply
universally. Recognizing that a significant draw of Nagel’s theory is how it restricts the scope of
justice to state borders, the second part of my argument will demonstrate that this restricted scope
can be similarly justified through cosmopolitanism. The third and final part of my argument will
involve a comparison of Nagel’s political conception and cosmopolitanism to demonstrate that the
latter is superior in both theory and practice.

A) Justice & Sovereignty under Cosmopolitanism
Nagel claims early in his paper that “[it] is only the operation of [a sovereign state’s
institutions] that one can judge to be just or unjust”.26 While this claim may make sense if one
adopts the political conception, it is inaccurate under the cosmopolitan view. Under
cosmopolitanism, justice is founded on the universal duty of fairness owed to all individuals.27
Consequently, the standards of justice are derived from the same duty of fairness and apply
universally. Any institution that purports to fulfill the demands of justice can be evaluated by the
standards of justice, independent of whether a sovereign authority enforces it. Now, Nagel is quite
right that institutions of justice are far less effective without the assurance of conformity that
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sovereignty provides, but this does not exclude them from the application of the standards of
justice. Ineffective fulfillment of justice is fulfillment of justice nonetheless, and any institution
purporting to do so is subject to standards of justice according to cosmopolitanism.
Nagel’s main argument for why only sovereign institutions engage standards of justice is
that “[separate] individuals, however attached to [justice], have no motive … to conform to
[institutions of justice] on their own, without the assurance that their conduct will in fact be part of
a reliable and effective system”.28 To rephrase this claim, Nagel is arguing that, unless there is a
guarantee of enforcement and conformity by all other members, one has no motive to participate
in an institution seeking to fulfill the demands of justice. I disagree. Under cosmopolitanism, the
duty of fairness requires each person to fulfill the demands of justice as best they can. If an
institution with no guarantee of unanimous conformity is the only way they can attempt such
fulfillment, they have an obligation to conform to it. The fact that others may opt out of the
institution and shirk their obligations under the duty of fairness does not change one’s own
obligation. Obligations of justice are not conditional on the conformity of others.
To summarize my point here, I believe that Nagel is wrong to assert that the standards of
justice only apply to sovereign institutions and instead, under the cosmopolitan approach, the
standards of justice apply to all institutions that purport to fulfill the demands of justice. This is an
important distinction, as Nagel’s focus on sovereign institutions has significant consequences on
how his theory applies to the real world, as will be seen in the critique’s third section.
Before moving on, I want to clarify that although I reject Nagel’s claim that standards of
justice only apply to sovereign institutions, I agree with his claim that cosmopolitan global justice
requires global sovereignty. Though non-sovereign institutions can certainly fulfill the demands of
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justice to varying degrees, sovereignty is required to ensure unanimous conformity. Fully satisfying
the demands of justice requires universal conformity to a single system of institutions; there must
be a method of enforcement and no possibility of opting out. Accordingly, cosmopolitan global
justice would indeed require global sovereignty.

B) Limiting the Scope of Justice to the State on the Cosmopolitan View
In discussion of why he finds the political conception more compelling, Nagel asserts his
belief that “the political conception is accepted by most people in the privileged nations of the
world…”. 29 While I believe that most people in privileged nations believe their obligations of
justice stop at the border, this does not mean that they accept the political conception. Restricting
the scope of justice to the boundaries of one’s state is not unique to the political conception and, as
I will demonstrate, it can be achieved while still endorsing cosmopolitanism.
To begin, consider how cosmopolitanism understands state sovereignty. While
cosmopolitanism does not view sovereignty as a prerequisite of justice, it also does not ignore
sovereignty’s role in meeting the demands of justice. By exercising their sovereignty, states can
ensure unanimous conformity with state institutions, guaranteeing consistent standards of justice
across their citizens. This allows sovereign institutions to fulfill the demands of justice far better
than their non-sovereign counterparts. As such, cosmopolitanism would view state sovereignty as
a very valuable asset. However, as Nagel points out “[if] one takes the cosmopolitan view, the
existence of separate sovereign states is an unfortunate obstacle… to the establishment or even the
pursuit of global justice”.30 While the existence of multiple sovereign states does stand in the way
of realizing a global sovereign, the sovereignty of these states allows them to create institutions
29
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that are far more effective at fulfilling the demands of justice that they owe to their citizens. This
fulfillment is imperfect, since each state will satisfy the demands of justice to its own standards,
and perfect fulfillment of the demands of justice would still require a global sovereign. However,
this imperfect satisfaction is far superior to the degree of satisfaction that would be achievable if
one were to reject state sovereignty altogether. While such a rejection would allow for a streamlined
process of achieving global sovereignty, the demands of justice would go largely unfulfilled while
the world agreed upon a global sovereign. In other words, though sovereign states impede the
process of achieving global sovereignty, they ensure a much higher level of fulfillment of the
demands of justice in the meantime. As such, it is not incompatible with cosmopolitanism to
endorse state sovereignty.
Having established that, in the absence of a global sovereign, cosmopolitanism can endorse
state sovereignty, the question remains how this endorsement can limit the scope of justice. Recall
that cosmopolitanism is founded on the belief that “the demands of justice derive from an equal
concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings…”.31 Though
it may seem incompatible to restrict the scope of justice to state borders while maintaining this duty
of fairness, I believe it can be done through the right to self-determination. As understood by the
UN, the right to self-determination is the right to freely choose one’s sovereignty without
interference, which naturally imposes a duty on all states to respect the sovereignty of other
nations.32 I believe the cosmopolitan view would endorse a right to self-determination, as doing so
would ensure states can create institutions with a guarantee of unanimous conformity; a task that
requires their sovereignty to be respected.
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The endorsement of the right to self-determination would also place a limit on the scope of
each country’s institutions of justice. While the universal duty of fairness may obligate a country
to fulfill the demands of justice of the citizens of a foreign nation, the right to self-determination
requires that they do so while still respecting the sovereignty of that nation. For example, a country
could fulfill the demands of justice of those in foreign nations through foreign aid and humanitarian
projects, as those methods respect the sovereignty of the recipient. Conversely, a country extending
the scope of its institutions of justice to include the citizens of a foreign country demonstrates a
clear disregard for the sovereignty of that foreign country. On the cosmopolitan view, fulfilling the
demands of justice of state citizens is the fundamental purpose for state sovereignty; attempting to
hijack that duty away from another country would be undermining the very purpose their
sovereignty serves. As such, the cosmopolitan view can restrict the scope of justice to state borders
and justify such restriction through the right to self-determination.

C) Cosmopolitanism is the Superior Theory
Having established that cosmopolitanism can endorse limiting the scope of justice to the
borders of the state, I will now address why one should choose it over Nagel’s political conception.
I believe cosmopolitanism is superior to Nagel’s view in both theory and practice, offering a far
clearer rationale and having greater applicability to the real world.
I.

Theory – Clarity in Rationale
Recall Nagel’s justification for restricting the scope of justice to state borders: justice is

dependent on the positive rights of citizenship,33 meaning that only citizens can make demands of
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justice and only from other citizens.34 The reason why citizenship serves as the basis for relations
of justice is that citizens are simultaneously authors and subjects of their states’ institutions.35
While it is not very clear what Nagel means by citizens being the ‘authors’ of their states’
institutions, he provides some explanation in the following passage:
I believe [what distinguishes citizenship from other arbitrary traits] comes from a special
involvement of agency or the will that is inseparable from membership in a political society.
Not the will to become or remain a member, … but the engagement of the will that is
essential to life inside a society, in the dual role each member plays both as one of the
society’s subjects and as one of those in whose name its authority is exercised. One might
even say that we are all participants in the general will.36
As evidenced by his reference to Rousseau’s ‘general will’, Nagel’s argument here seems to be
that states represent the collective will of their citizens and, as such, that when a state acts it acts in
the name of its citizenry. Since the state serves the collective will of its citizens, each citizen is
somewhat responsible for the state’s institutions. Accordingly, citizens serve as the ‘authors’ of
their state’s institutions in the sense that they authorize the state’s actions, which they are then
subject to. This shared authorship entitles them to make demands of justice from each other. It then
follows that non-citizens, as they do not share this authorizing role, cannot make such demands.
I find this reliance on the concept of a ‘collective will’ rather problematic for Nagel’s
political conception. Participation in the collective will is what separates citizens from non-citizens;
it is what distinguishes those entitled to justice from those that are not. Despite this crucial role,
however, Nagel never explains what this participation entails, and so we are left to speculate as to
what acts might constitute participation in the collective will.
So what kind of act would we be looking for? Obviously, the act must have some influence
over the government to count as influencing the collective will. The act must also be ubiquitous
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among citizens, as all citizens are participants in the collective will. Lastly, the act must be
exclusive to citizens; otherwise, noncitizens would have just as much of a claim. With these criteria
in mind, voting in democratic elections seems like the ideal choice. Since elections determine who
makes up the government, and voting rights are reserved exclusively for citizens, voting seems like
the perfect example of citizens acting as authors of their states. Upon further inspection, however,
this proves inaccurate. While it is easy to say that those who voted for the party that took office are
contributing to the collective will, what about everyone else? Clearly those that voted for a different
party believe the current government does not represent their beliefs; one could hardly say they are
being represented in the collective will. Likewise, those disenfranchised due to youth or mental
incapacity can’t participate in the general will. And then there are those who chose not to vote and
those who simply forgot. The act of voting is only representative of participation in the collective
will for a portion of citizens; have all the rest lost their entitlement to justice? Not to mention, not
all countries hold democratic elections; would failure to do so invalidate their institutions of
justice? With the seemingly surefire example of voting proving problematic, it is difficult to
imagine an activity that is ubiquitous among, and exclusive to, citizens that could constitute
participation in the collective will. While acts like political protest and activism would certainly
influence the government, they are neither ubiquitous nor exclusive to citizens.
In response to this, Nagel might raise the following defense: while one cannot point to a
specific activity that equates to participation in the collective will, there is a more general sense by
which citizens participate. It could be that there are several passive things citizens do on a daily
basis to contribute to the collective will. While I can understand the sentiment behind this defense,
the question of what participation in the collective will entails demands a more concrete answer.
According to Nagel’s argument, participation in the collective will is something so important and
unique to citizens that it allows citizenship, an otherwise arbitrary trait, to serve as the basis for
15

claims of justice. Considering the vital role it plays, being unable to explain or provide an actual
example of what participation in the collective will looks like severely undercuts the strength of
Nagel’s argument. Such is the crux of the issue with the Nagel’s focus on citizenship; the idea that
citizens are ‘authors’ of their state’s institutions by participation in some collective will is too vague
a concept to serve as justification for limiting the scope of something as important as distributive
rights, as it is unclear what said participation even entails.
Now, compare Nagel’s rationale to the reasoning I provided for limiting justice on the
cosmopolitan view (see section B). First, everyone has a claim to justice based on the universal
duty of fairness owed to all human beings. Second, cosmopolitanism values state sovereignty for
its role in greatly improving the ability of state institutions to fulfill the demands of justice, and
would therefore endorse a right to self-determination to protect state sovereignty. And third, the
scope of obligations owed by the state is limited to those within its borders by the duty to respect
the sovereignty of other states. My argument relies on straightforward concepts and provides a
clear rationale for each step. Following this comparison, it is apparent that the cosmopolitan view
offers a far clearer rationale for limiting the scope of justice than Nagel’s political conception.
II. Practice – Applicability to the Real World
In addition to using vague concepts as key justifying principles, Nagel’s political
conception is also incapable of explaining socioeconomic justice as it functions in the real world.
Recall, Nagel’s political conception holds that “[the] full standards of justice … apply only within
the boundaries of a sovereign state…”37 By Nagel’s account, a state without sovereignty lacks the
coercive power to impose a duty of justice on its citizens and, as such, justice cannot exist within
its borders. Yet, in reality, there are countries without sovereignty that provide socioeconomic
37
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justice for their citizens without issue.
Consider the case of Gibraltar. Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory under the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Though under the UK’s sovereignty, citizens of Gibraltar are
not citizens of the UK and do not participate in its elections or social institutions. Instead, Gibraltar
is a self-governing country with its own complex systems of law, education, and taxation. Most
notably, Gibraltar’s government has its own system of socioeconomic justice, offering welfare,
social insurance, and a variety of other benefits to its citizens.38
How would Nagel’s political conception understand justice with respect to Gibraltar?
Under Nagel's view, the demands of justice are based upon the positive rights associated with
citizenship to a sovereign state.39 As Gibraltar is not a sovereign state, its citizens have no claim to
justice. Following from this, Gibraltar’s government owes no obligations of justice to its citizens,
and all the benefits it has thus far provided them are merely charity that could be revoked at any
time. Additionally, Gibraltar’s institutions are not held to any standards of justice, as those are
exclusively reserved for sovereign institutions. Lacking any standards of justice, Gibraltar’s
government can choose to allocate its social resources along arbitrary lines, such as race or gender,
if it so chooses. This view of Gibraltar is problematic, to say the least.
Finally, consider how cosmopolitanism would understand justice with respect to Gibraltar.
Regardless of whether they are citizens of a sovereign state, Gibraltar’s citizens are human beings
and have a claim to justice through the universal duty of fairness. Gibraltar’s social institutions,
though not the product of a sovereign government, are still held to the standards of justice, as said
standards apply universally. Unlike Nagel’s theory, cosmopolitanism would treat Gibraltar the
38
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same way it would any sovereign country, awarding its people the same rights to justice and
holding the country’s institutions to the same standards of justice.
Comparing these two understandings of justice in Gibraltar, I think it is quite clear that
cosmopolitanism better accounts for justice as it functions in the real world. Moreover, Gibraltar
is not a unique case, as there are fourteen British Overseas Territories. There are also numerous
constitutional monarchies such as Canada that lack their own sovereignty. As the case of Gibraltar
demonstrates, exclusively reserving standards of justice for sovereign states and refusing to
acknowledge non-sovereign institutions as sites of justice poses a serious problem for Nagel’s
theory. Cosmopolitanism, recognizing universal standards of justice, is unfazed by countries with
varying levels of sovereignty, including those with no sovereignty at all. As a result,
cosmopolitanism provides a more accurate account of how justice functions in practice.
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Conclusion:
In his work, Nagel set out to provide the account of global justice he found most plausible.
Beginning with the claim that only sovereign institutions could be just or unjust, Nagel outlined
how cosmopolitanism and the political conception would view global justice. Expanding on the
political conception, Nagel’s version derived justice from the relations of citizenship. Nagel then
distinguished citizenship from other arbitrary traits by highlighting the roles of author and subject
a citizen plays in their society. Despite Nagel’s best efforts, his theory turns out to be far less
compelling than cosmopolitanism when the two are compared. Cosmopolitanism imposes the same
restrictions on the scope of justice and justifies them through respect for state sovereignty and the
right to self-determination; far more coherent concepts than citizens being the ‘authors’ of their
state’s institutions. Additionally, cosmopolitanism views the standards of justice as universal in
their application, allowing the theory to deal with complex cases of sovereignty like Gibraltar;
cases that cannot be reconciled with Nagel’s exclusive focus on sovereign intuitions. As my
critique has established, cosmopolitanism can endorse the same state-limited scope of justice as
Nagel’s political conception while offering a clearer rationale for doing so with greater
applicability to reality.
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